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Abstract
This paper examines how global integration influences worker behavior regarding skill acquisition, as
well as firm behavior regarding incentive contracts and occupational diversity. The approach integrates
several key components of international trade and the wage distribution in developed countries: namely
heterogeneous firms, trade in similar goods, and performance payments to workers that endogenously
obtain different skill levels. Greater trading opportunities reduce aggregate prices, causing workers to
experience a greater marginal utility derived from income, as well as the skills that aid them in fulfilling
performance contracts. Firms respond to skill accumulation among the labor force by adjusting the
provision of incentive contracts, and the types of jobs they offer. Labor market adjustment to trade
liberalization is characterized by a more steep, but less extensive, provision of incentive contracts among
the labor force; higher overall wage inequality exhibiting a U-shaped differential; and job polarization
across skill-groups.
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1 Introduction
International trade flows reflect selection of individual firms into international markets. Addressing the
relationship between trade and factor returns then requires an analysis of how individual firms interact with
their workforce, and with the labor supply in general. A burgeoning trade literature has begun to include key
aspects of labor market structure to relate trade and wages, such as worker heterogeneity, unemployment
or rent-sharing within firms and the so-called exporter premium1. On the other hand, a large empirical
literature among labor economists highlights different elements affecting the wage distribution: namely
endogenous skill acquisition, payments via incentive contracts, and the occupation of employment, rather
than the particular firm2. This paper brings these two literatures together by developing a framework that
incorporates contracting problems over multiple occupations and worker skills into a global economy with
heterogeneous firms.
To be specific, I examine (1) how workers respond to trade liberalization with regard to skill acquisition,
and (2) the subsequent adjustment in the composition of jobs and performance contracts that firms offer when
the labor supply changes shape. These issues are important for at least two reasons. First, many countries
have experienced changes in their aggregate wage distribution characterized by an increasing 90/50 wage gap,
but a steady or shrinking 50/10 wage gap. Trends in employment shares across the skill distribution exhibit
a similarly complex pattern. Rather than the skill-biased shifts in labor usage, employment has become more
polarized in several developed countries. See Goos and Manning (2007) for evidence from the UK; Autor et
al. (2006) and Autor et al. (2008) for evidence from the US; Dustmann et al. (2009) for evidence in West
Germany; and Goos et al. (2009) for evidence from several European nations. Moreover, incentive contracts
have expanded as a method of payment, and determine much of the variation in wages among high skilled
workers. See Lemieux et al. (2009). In order to asses the role of openness in these aggregate trends (if any),
a framework relating incentive contracts, occupational diversity and trade is needed.
Second, evidence of micro-level adjustments in occupations and performance payments has already begun
to emerge. Cun˜at and Guadalupe (2005, 2009) find that greater international competition induced UK and
US manufacturing firms to change their provision of incentive contracts. Furthermore, Guadalupe and Wulf
(forthcoming) and Bresnahan et al. (2002) observe individual firms shifting the occupations they offer, and
their skill demands, in response to globalization. Understanding the economic forces that induce firms to
respond to international exposure in this way requires an examination of their contracting problem with
1For review of recent work on trade and worker heterogeneity see Davidson and Sly (2010), for trade and unemployment
see Davidson and Matusz (2009) and more generally for globalization and wages see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004, 2007), and
Feenstra and Hanson (2003).
2For cross country evidence on the importance of worker characteristics and occupation in determining individual wages see
Abowd and Kramarz (1999) and Menezes-Filho et al. (2008).
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worker and occupational diversity.
The approach integrates firm choices regarding occupational mix and the provision of performance con-
tracts across multiple workers, as in Kim and Sly (2010), into the standard Melitz (2003) heterogeneous firm
model of international trade. Workers are fully mobile and heterogenous with respect to ability. Each worker
makes choices regarding skill acquisition and team formation (i.e. matching) to ensure the best employment
opportunities possible. Given the behavior of the labor force, firms decide on the composition of jobs and
incentive contracts to offer, aimed at attracting the highest quality workforce possible. Competition for
recruits induces endogenous heterogeneity in occupational mix across firms.
Though it is often overlooked by trade economists, skill accumulation among the labor force is key
to understanding labor market adjustment to trade. Firms choose the employment contracts they offer
with the objective of maximizing recruiting potential3. Suppose that the labor supply were fixed, in that
the distribution of skill were exogenously determined. Then firms in a closed economy, open economy or
liberalizing economy would face the same recruiting opportunities regardless. The composition of incentive
contracts and jobs would not change as countries become more or less integrated. However, if workers change
their skill acquisition behavior when markets open, then firms must reconsider their hiring strategies. Hence
all three elements of the model – endogenous skill acquisition, incentive contracts and occupational mix –
are necessary to understand labor market adjustment to trade.
In the framework presented here, occupations differ within individual firms because workers receive
varying levels of direction in how to steer their efforts toward successful performance. This human resource
strategy is often called ’developing agent champions’ within a team. Each firm has fixed capability to direct
workers, and must choose how to allocate this capability across the workforce4. For simplicity I allow firms
to have two different choices about how to interact with their workforce: each firm can offer a diffuse set of
occupations, where some jobs are associated with large investments in promoting worker success, along with
others that receive little direction; or the firm can choose to offer similar occupations to its entire workforce,
with each worker receiving moderate levels of direction in their efforts. The two strategies can be interpreted
as relying primarily on a few champion workers with a high probability of success, or many workers with
moderate chances of success.
The production technology of each firm depends first on the performance of its workforce, and second
on the (heterogeneous) ability of firms to take advantage of labor performances. Firms which draw greater
productivity parameters are able to generate more output from each individual worker success. Strictly
3Lazear (2000) provides evidence that increasing the provision of incentive contracts generates gains primarily through better
recruiting outcomes.
4Bandiera et al. (2007) find that managers make specific choices regarding direction given to workers, and that this choice
is partially determined by the incentive contract the manager is given.
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speaking, the production process consists of a series of random trials across the workforce employed at
each firm. Individual workers realize success stochastically, conditional on their effort level and occupation.
Total output by a firm is the number of successes among the workforce augmented by its own productivity
parameter. Aggregate labor productivity is greater when workers are motivated effectively, and firms that
are better able to capture individual performances operate in equilibrium.
Workers pursue jobs that give them the best chances of fulfilling performance contracts. Competition
with full mobility leads to positive assignment of workers across occupations and performance incentives.
That is, high-skilled workers are employed in occupations associated with the greatest incentive contracts,
consistent with evidence in Lemieux et al. (2009) and Bayo-Moriones et al. (2010). Firms anticipate this
organization of the labor force and choose which type of employment vacancies to create accordingly.
There are two sets of results presented below. The first set directly relates trade liberalization to the be-
havior of workers and firms. As in Melitz (2003) global integration induces selection effects and reallocations
of production across firms that raise average productivity, and lower aggregate prices. Workers recognize
that at lower prices the marginal utility of income, and the skills which aid them in fulfilling performance
contracts, are higher. So, openness leads to greater skill accumulation among the labor force5. With a more
skill abundant labor supply, firms subsequently alter the employment opportunities they offer. Following
trade liberalization a greater share of firms offer diffuse sets of occupations, with stronger performance pay-
ments given to the relatively skilled members of their workforce. While the provision of incentive contracts
is more steep, it is less extensive in an open economy. Trade reduces the share of the labor force receiving
performance pay.
The second set of results connects these micro-level adjustments to the overall wage distribution and
the distribution of firm productivity. Changes in firm hiring strategies cause employment to become more
polarized; i.e. trade increases the employment share of high- and low- skill occupations, while reducing the
share of middle-skill occupations in total employment. This change in labor usage and the accompanying
shift in performance contracts increase wage inequality across skill groups. Specifically, the top and bottom
end of the wage distribution grow relative to the median earnings level. Inequality within the highest and
lowest skill groups also rises. Furthermore, the relationship between openness and welfare is ambiguous
in general. Although trade lowers aggregate prices for all consumers, changes in the provision of incentive
contracts increase volatility in wages on average, harming risk-adverse workers.
5Falvey et al. (2010) have shown that workers do skill-update when international competition intensifies, but highlight
import competition as the leading mechanism inducing skill acquisition. Also, Falvey et al. (2008) discuss patterns of human
capital adjustment in a two sector model of trade with differences in worker ages and abilities. Again, this does not the reflect
the current setting, but does suggest that workers consider the their employment potential in a global economy when making
decisions about skill acquisition.
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Openness changes the composition of firms and incentive contracts offered, impacting overall volatility in
firm-level productivity via two channels. The first is a Team Composition Effect that reduces the variability in
firm-level productivities because workers satisfy (and fail) their performance contracts with more regularity.
The second is a Firm Composition Effect that increases the observed variability of firm-level productivity.
Selection of low productivity firms out of the market generates larger swings in output as labor performances
within firms vary stochastically.
This paper lies at the intersection of trade and labor literatures regarding the wage distribution. Within
the ”new trade theory”, the discussion of factor returns has typically emphasized differences in payments
across firms rather than across occupations. See for example Manasse and Turrini (2001) and Yeaple (2005),
with empirical evidence in Bernard and Jensen (1997, 1999), Verhoogen (2008), Fr´ıas et al. (2009) and
Burstein and Vogel (2009). In the current context I abstract from the exporter premium and technologies
with skill complementarities to highlight occupational and skill diversity within firms. In addition, this
analysis introduces performance contracts as a payment mechanism used to overcome information problems
surrounding production. Others have examined trade and the income distribution using fair wage mechanisms
(Egger and Kreickemeier (2009)), efficiency wages (Matusz (1996) and Davis and Harrigan (2008)), and intra-
firm bargaining/ rent sharing (Davidson et al. (2008), and Sly (2009), Cosar et al. (2009), and Helpman et al.
(2010)) into trade models with heterogeneous firms. To my knowledge there is no other theoretical framework
that addresses performance contracts and heterogeneous firms in open economies. Yet, Grossman (2004) and
Vogel (2007) consider trade and the organization of the labor force when performance (rather than effort)
cannot always be attributed to individual workers because of information constraints and poor institutional
quality, respectively.
This paper also relates to the growing trade and matching literature. Costinot and Vogel (forthcoming)
develop tools to address trade with exogenous changes in the distribution of factor endowments in Roy-
like assignment models. Antra`s et al. (2006) examine how potential for offshoring influences occupational
diversity across skill groups with competitive wages. Other contributions include Davidson et al. (1999),
Grossman and Maggi (2000), Bougheas and Riezman (2007), and Bombardini et al. (2009). This approach
is distinct in that I consider endogenous shifts in the shape of the labor supply following liberalization and
highlight both the matching (team formation) and assignment to occupations as allocations problems that
labor markets must resolve.
A large literature has examined the distributions of income and employment the world over, and I cannot
hope to review its entirety here. This paper fits directly into a recent strand that has emphasized polarization
in both wages and employment shares, rather than skill-biased shifts within labor markets. Lemieux (2007)
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provides an excellent review of how the nature of wage inequality has changed in recent history. The roles of
educational attainment and technology in shaping the income distribution are detailed in Goldin and Katz
(2008) and Acemoglu (2002). With the availability of employer-employee matched data sets from several
countries, wage distributions have been decomposed into worker, occupation and establishment (firm or
plant) effects, that I emphasize here; see for example Abowd and Kramarz (1999) and Menezes-Filho et al.
(2008). International factors such as immigration and offshoring have been introduced to explain polarization
in the labor markets in developed economies. See for example the 2009 Richard T. Ely lecture from David
Card, Borjas (2003), Borjas et al. (1997), Goos et al. (2009) and Feenstra and Hanson (2003) in addition to
the references above.
The next section of the paper introduces the model and details the specific behaviors of workers and
firms in open economies. Section 3 derives an unique equilibrium where the aggregate features of product
markets are stationary and the allocation in the labor market is in the core. Section 3 also presents key
results that link firm behavior regarding the provision of incentive contracts and occupational mix to the
distribution of labor productivity and wages. Product market adjustment to trade is addressed in Section
4 and labor market adjustment is taken up in Section 5. The effects of openness on the wage distribution
and welfare are discuss in Section 6. Section 7 provides a brief discussion of the model and results, while the
final section concludes.
2 Model
The basic framework of the model includes two identical countries which produce a single final consumption
good comprised of several individual varieties. Firms produce differentiated products, using only labor, with
each worker assigned a single occupation. Firms offer a variety of occupations and must choose the mix
of jobs, denoted by j, to offer. Every firm possesses a specific productivity parameter, θ, that reflects its
ability to generate output as individual workers complete their respective jobs. Thus an individual firm can
be characterized by a pairing (j, θ). Heterogeneity across firms will be reflected in the exogenous realization
of productivity, and the endogenous selection of jobs to offer.
Firms recruit workers from a heterogeneous labor supply with total mass L. Workers differ according
to their ability, a, with the atomless distribution given by G(a) on [amin, amax]. Higher ability agents can
and acquire skills, s, at a lower marginal cost to their over all utility. During production workers experience
disutility from their efforts, e, though higher skills make effort less onerous at the margin. Workers are fully
mobile utility maximizers that pursue the best employment opportunities available.
6
Once employed, the relationship between firms and labor is characterized by an agency problem whereby
workers need incentives to provide effort that cannot be observed directly by the firm. It will be more
convenient to first describe the product market environment in which firms operate. Then I will describe
the agency problem that surrounds production and finally the behaviors of individual workers and firms.
2.1 Consumption
Consumers in each economy are workers who use their income to purchase varieties of the final consumption
good; demand for an individual product, ω is given by x(ω). All consumers have common tastes with CES
preferences across varieties.
X =
 ∫
ω∈Ω
x(ω)ρdω
1/ρ (1)
An individual firm sets the price of its product to p(·). Subsequently the aggregate price index, P , can
be written as a weighted average of the prices of individual products:
P =
 ∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)1−βdω
 11−β with β = 1
1− ρ (2)
2.2 Production
Consumers costlessly assemble differentiated products within industries into the final consumption good.
Production of varieties occurs in firms, resulting from the successful completion of tasks. Firms hire teams
of labor to complete an array of production tasks, but individual workers are assigned to independent
occupations. That is, each worker provides effort toward a single task. Let n denote the number of different
occupations that firms offer, and l(·) denote the mass of teams that a firm hires. In all firms the production
process exhibits informational problems such that firms cannot directly observe the efforts of labor6.
There are two key features of the agency problem surrounding production. First, though firms cannot
observe the efforts of workers, they do observe if an individual worker is successful in completing her task.
Effort increases the probability that a worker is successful: for a worker providing effort level, e, the prob-
ability she accomplishes her task independently is p(e), where production responds to efforts continuously
according to p′′(e) < 0 < p′(e).
6In addition to being the simplest framework to expose, the production environment with simultaneous efforts on independent
tasks contains the weakest incentives for assortative matching to arise in equilibrium. Hierarchies of agents within firms or other
coordinated efforts would reinforce the strategic complementarities derived below. That is, these models of firm productions
which are more relevant would generate the same conclusions. None of the results depend on the simultaneity of efforts or
independence of tasks, rather they are obtained despite these assumptions. See Kim (2010) and Kim and Sly (2010) for more
discussion on this point.
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The second feature of the agency problem is that firms have the capability to advise workers in their
efforts. Interaction between the firm and its labor force across occupations follows Kim and Sly (2010).
Each firm has a fixed capacity Γ > 0 to direct the efforts of its work force. Better direction improves the
probability that effort leads to successful production. For example all of the n workers in a production
team are successful with probability Γ
(
n∏
k=1
p (ek)
)
. More details about how firms divide this capacity into
individual occupations, and the specific job mix j that firms adopt, will be provided below.
The interaction between workers and firms could take several forms. Each task can represent a specific
feature of a product. For example smart phones now enable internet access, calendar features, texting,
applications, cameras and differ in appearance. While each feature might appeal to consumers, firms that
devote more attention to particular components, say providing browser services, are better able to direct
worker efforts toward the consumer tastes. So, workers assigned to produce the internet capability in the
phone are more likely to be successful. Also, the independent tasks can represent separate product lines.
Workers will view employment across product lines differently when the firm makes larger investments in
advertising for certain products than others. Better exposure can increase the probability that a worker’s
effort, and in turn her specific product, will be successfully received in the market place7.
Each success allows the firm to generate output. Let t (%e, j) denote the number of successes that arise
when an array of workers exerting effort levels given by %e, employed in corresponding occupations belonging
to job mix j. Upon completion of any individual task, a specific firm produces θ units of output. Hence the
total output of a particular team of n workers at a specific firm (j, θ) is given by
θt (%e, j) (3)
Equation (3) indicates that total production at each firm depends on its own productivity, the number
of teams hired, and the realized performances of individual workers. Worker performances reflect their own
skill and effort decisions, as well as the occupations offered by firms. So to complete the description of
production I turn next to the behaviors of workers and firms.
2.3 Firm Behavior
There is an unbounded mass of potential firms that can choose to engage in production freely. Firms make
a series of preliminary choices in anticipation of product and labor market conditions. Following the Melitz
7Though multiproduct firms are quite prevalent, and teams in different product lines are likely to work independently, I
adopt the interpretation where different tasks correspond to different features of single products to avoid the complications of
endogenous product scope, or firms that face several demand curves across various products.
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standard, firms make sunk investments that reveal their productivity from a known distribution. If a firm
decides to participate in any market it incurs fixed costs each period to maintain employment vacancies.
Hiring decisions are characterized by a mass of workers to employ, as well as a specific mix of occupations
to offer. Once the firm has recruited a workforce, it sets rewards to motivate efforts. Finally the firm engages
in production and sets prices for each market in which it participates. This section provides details about
each of these firm activities.
2.3.1 Firm Entry and Market Participation
Entry by a firm is a two-stage process. Firms must first incur a sunk investment cost of fe, after which the
firm realizes its productivity parameter, θ, drawn from the known distribution Z(θ). The density of potential
firm productivities, z(θ), is defined over (0,∞). Subsequently, if a firm decides to engage in production, each
period the firm must pay a fixed cost f in order to create and maintain employment vacancies for its a
workforce. Participating in foreign markets requires the firm to pay a fixed fx each period that it exports.
Fixed costs are expressed in terms of labor teams that must be hired.
In addition to the fixed costs to access foreign markets, firms incur transportation costs for each unit of
output sent abroad. Transportation costs are given by τ and exhibit the typical iceberg nature; a firm must
ship τ > 1 units to the foreign market for a single unit to arrive. I make the standard assumption regarding
the size of trade costs: τβ−1fx > f . This assumption partitions firms according to their productivity
parameter θ, such that the most productive firms export while the least productive firms do not8.
2.3.2 Firm Job Mix and Hiring
Once a firm knows its own productivity level it is able to predict how competitive it can be in product
markets, and so decides on the size of a work force it should recruit. Given the heterogenous supply of labor
each firm is also concerned with the quality of the workforce it hires. As workers sort into occupations, the
job mix that firms make available will determine potential recruiting outcomes. Hence the firm must decide
how to allocate its fixed capability, Γ, to direct effort across its workforce.
Let γkj denote occupation k within job mix j. Occupations are defined so that a worker putting forth
effort level e performs successfully with probability γkj p(e). When a firm offers a few occupations with large
investments in directing effort (high γkj ), the corresponding workers will be relatively more likely to generate
output. Yet, the constraint on how well firms can address the agency problem dictates that workers in the
remaining occupations receive little investment from the firm in directing their efforts, and are less likely to
8See evidence of this sorting on productivities in Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Roberts and Tybout (1997).
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Figure 1: Provision of Incentives across Occupations
perform (effort held constant). Thus each firm faces a trade-off between occupational mixes: rely primarily
on a few workers with a high probability of success, or many workers with moderate chances of success.
Specifically let the first occupational mix (j=1) spread the firm’s fixed capability to direct workers simi-
larly across occupations. Suppose the second mix of jobs (j=2) is relatively diffuse, with some occupations
that are more likely to translate effort into successful production, as well as some occupations that are not
likely to generate output independently. See Figure 1. The relative diversity of occupations, indexed by j=2,
corresponds to the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property about a particular occupation kˆ, where 1 < kˆ < n
and γkˆ1 #= γkˆ2 . Ranking occupations within each job mix in order of magnitude, indexed by k, the relative
diversity between occupational mixes satisfies the following definition.
Definition 1 Occupational mix indexed by j=2 is said to be more diffuse such that for any h ≥ 1.
γkˆ−h−12
γkˆ−h−11
<
γkˆ−h2
γkˆ−h1
and
γkˆ+h2
γkˆ+h1
<
γkˆ+h+12
γkˆ+h+11
Workers responsible for generating output are hired in teams. The size of teams is set arbitrarily to n.
So, regardless of the job mix offered, the fixed capability to address the agency problem requires9
Γ =
n∏
k=1
γkj for j = 1, 2 (4)
The hiring strategy of a firm describes the composition of employment. Regarding size of the workforce,
9As is standard when contracting with multiple agents, I impose the following regularity conditions on the produc-
tion environment: first, 0 ≤ Γp(e) < 1, and second, for any potential effort levels, e1, e2, put forth by workers,
p′′ (e1) p′′ (e2) p (e1) p (e2)− [p′ (e1) p′ (e2)]2 > 0. These assumptions imply that firms can never perfectly direct their workforce,
and that strategic interactions exist between the workers in any team.
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the mass of teams l(·) demanded by a particular firm, (j, θ), is given by
l(j, θ) = f +
q
θt (%e, j)
(5)
Note that nl(·) is the total mass of workers hired by the firm. Though all firms face the same information
problems during production, those characterized by higher values of θ exhibit better labor productivity on
average, and those that subsequently recruit and motivate a better workforce experience greater productive
efficiency.
The final type of occupation that firms offer is a job without risk, necessary to perform the fixed set
of tasks necessary for entry (fe), to maintain employment vacancies (f) and fixed exporting tasks (fx). I
assume this job requires minimal effort to complete10. After a firm has entered and recruited a workforce,
it needs to motivate workers to provide effort. Rewards for successful task completion are described next.
2.3.3 Firm Payments to Workers
Each firm must provide incentive contracts where performance requires unobserved effort and is uncertain.
An employment contract specifies rewards for each type of signal received: the firm chooses the payments
vs when the entire team is successful, vw to the workers who perform and vf to those who fail when only a
fraction of the team is successful, and vo to each worker when no one succeeds.
These payments can vary continuously, and be made commensurate with the skill of workers recruited.
However I classify the wage schemes in the typical manner. A payment scheme is said to be Joint Performance
Evaluation (JPE) if
(
vs, vf
)
> (vw, vo). Under JPE there are strong team incentives since a worker is made
better off by good performance of her partner. The firm is said to use Relative Performance Evaluation
(RPE) if the optimal contract satisfies
(
vs, vf
)
< (vw, vo). RPE provides strong competitive incentives since
workers are best off when they outperform their partner.
Although the firm has freedom in how it chooses to reward workers, I do impose a limited liability re-
striction. Workers cannot be forced to make payments to the firm, regardless of their performance. Incentive
contracts offered by the firm must satisfy
vs, vw, vf , vo ≥ 0
10The assumption that fixed production tasks requires little effort implicitly assumes that these are low-skill occupations.
Later when deriving labor market adjustment to trade liberalization, this assumption will only impact the provision of incentive
contracts across the skill distribution. The evidence that incentive contracts are most prevalent among the highest skilled in
the labor force is fairly robust; see Lemieux et al. (2009) and Bayo-Moriones et al. (2010). Thus I maintain the assumption
that fixed production tasks represent occupations with low-skill intensity.
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The remaining constraint on performance payments that firms can offer reflects the incentives of workers to
accept contracts in a competitive labor market. Worker behavior is described in a later section.
I will use the notation V (%s, j, θ) to represent the optimal performance contract offered to an array of
workers %s by a specific firm (j, θ). Further, let %V (·) represent the payments to workers following the realization
of performance. Firms also hire labor into an occupation to complete the fixed production tasks necessary
for entry and to maintain employment vacancies. I set the competitive wage for these workers to be the
numeraire11.
2.3.4 Firm Prices and Profits
Consumer preferences for variety in (1) imply that firms face an iso-elastic demand curve for their products.
The optimal behavior of firms is to charge prices that are fixed mark-ups over unit costs. A firm that recruits
an array of workers %s, to occupations in job mix j, and with productivity θ charges the price12
p (%s, j, θ) =
1
ρ
%V (%s, j, θ)
θt (%e, j)
(6)
At its optimal price level, a particular firm realizes (ex post) profits in the domestic market equal to
ΠD (%s, j, θ) =
XP
β
(
ρPθt (%e, j)
%V (%s, j, θ)
)β−1
− f (7)
If a firm decides to export to the foreign market it earns additional profits equal to foreign revenues net of pro-
duction and exporting costs. Exporting firms charge higher prices in foreign markets to cover transportation
costs and subsequently earn (where asterisks denote foreign aggregate variables)
ΠX (%s, j, θ) =
X∗P ∗
β
(
ρP ∗θt (%e, j)
τ %V (%s, j, θ)
)β−1
− fx (8)
Perfectly competitive labor markets with full worker mobility will equalize the expected payment per per-
formance, V ($s,j,θ)t($e,j) , across firms. No worker will accept employment where greater incentives exist elsewhere.
Since all firms anticipate the same costs for worker performance, the ex ante relative outputs and revenues
11Thus an employment contract specifies {vs, vw, vf , vo, 1}, with each vp paid only to production workers, Lpj , while
investment workers used to perform entry tasks, Lentj , earn a wage equal to unity.
12For notational convenience I have expressed the price charged for goods produced by a specific team within a firm having
productivity θ. Firms could also be thought to charge a single price that is a fixed markup over average unit costs realized over
all production teams, (1/l(j, θ))
R !V (!s,j,θ)
t(!e,j) dl(j, θ), or varying prices slightly at each moment in time for units cost that arise for
the team active at that instant. Because firms will make all investment and hiring decisions prior to the realization of unit
costs, only the constant expectation for either interpretation will be crucial to deriving an equilibrium.
12
of any two firms in a particular market are functions solely of their productivity parameters. For example,
relative outputs and revenues anticipated between any two firms in the domestic market can be written
x(j, θ˙)
x(j, θ)
=
(
θ˙
θ
)β
and
r(j, θ˙)
r(j, θ)
=
(
θ˙
θ
)β−1
(9)
The relationships in (9) demonstrate that firms with higher values of θ are expected to produce relatively
more output and earn more revenues in anticipation of recruiting outcomes. A similar relationship between
profits across firms with different productivities exists. The fact that anticipated payments, V ($s,j,θ)t($e,j) , are
constant across firms does not preclude them from paying different wages in equilibrium. Firms that are
fortunate in their recruiting can offer smaller incentive contracts as skilled workers are easier to motivate.
Subsequently, the realization of labor performance causes wages to vary, even across identical firms and
workers. Yet expected payments per performance must remain constant as labor are fully mobile and seek
the best employment opportunities.
2.4 Worker Behavior
Once employed, each worker maximizes her indirect utility function Ba by selecting optimal levels of effort
and skill acquisition. Workers are rewarded based on their performance relative to other workers in their
production teams, so it will be notationally convenient to define an object that represents for any worker
that acquires skill s, the probability that the rest of her team is able to produce. Let ((s) be the probability
that every worker in a team with abilities given by %s completes their task, excluding worker s. Similarly
define η(s) as the probability that any other worker is able to perform13. Then a worker with ability a, in
occupation γkj , and facing aggregate prices P solves the following problem:
max
e,s
Ba = γkj p (e)
{
((s)U(vs, P ) + (1− ((s))U (vw, P )
}
+
[
1− γkj p (e)
]{
η(s)U(vf , P ) + (1− η(s))U (vo, P )
}
− e
s
− s
a
Laborers with greater innate ability a can acquire skills at a lower marginal cost to their overall utility. Upon
attaining a particular education level, better skills reduce the marginal disutility of effort. All laborers share
risk adverse attitudes toward income so that the sub-utility function satisfies U1(·) > U(0, p) = 0 > U11(·).
13Computing the expected performances of independent workers yields
"(s) =
Y
s′∈!s,
s′ $=s
Γ
γkj
p (es′ ) and η(s) = 1−
Y
s′∈!s,
s′ $=s
h
1− γkj p (es′ )
i
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3 Equilibrium
This paper focuses on long-run equilibria where product and labor market allocations are stable. That is, I
consider steady-state equilibria in the product market where the composition of firms, prices and aggregate
profits are stationary, given that the allocation of the labor force is stable. Specifically a product market
equilibrium is defined as a distribution of active firms for each choice of occupational mix, µj(θ), the mass
of active firms choosing each job mix, Mj , and a productivity cutoff θexj that defines which firms export
to the foreign market. Together the distribution and mass of firms serving the domestic market determine
aggregate prices, for any equilibrium allocation of the labor force.
A labor market equilibrium is defined as a core allocation of the labor force, where matching into teams
and assignments to occupations are stable. An equilibrium in the labor market consists of sets of skill levels
assigned to each occupation, Σkj , matching correspondences between workers that are employed in the same
team (and thus the same firm), Ckj : Σ1j → Σkj for k = 2...n, worker efforts levels and skill acquisitions, e and
s, and incentive contracts with performance payments to workers given by V (%s, j, θ).
3.1 Distribution of Active Firms
Upon entry the firm realizes its own productivity θ and then must consider whether or not to produce,
given the fixed cost to create employment vacancies. The firm will decide to engage in production as long
it anticipates a labor force skilled enough to generate non-negative profits for either hiring strategy. For a
stable allocation of labor across occupations, let s¯j be the array of workers a firm can anticipate to recruit
in equilibrium14. Total profit for a firm is Π(·) = ΠD(·) + ΠX(·). So rational behavior by firms defines a
zero-anticipated-profit cutoff for each occupational mix, θoj , which satisfies
Π
(
s¯j , j, θ
o
j
) ≡ 0 (ZAP)
If a firm draws a productivity below θoj for both j=1,2 it exits immediately. For each job mix, the ex
post distribution of active firms is defined by the ZAP cutoff. Active firms have productivities distributed
according to z(θ), truncated at the zero-anticipated-profit cutoff, or
µj(θ) =

z(θ)
1− Z(θoj )
, for θ ≥ θoj
0 , otherwise
14Anticipated recruiting outcomes are discussed below following the derivation of a labor market equilibrium.
14
Firms are willing to serve foreign markets only if they can anticipate non-negative profits from abroad,
net of fixed border penetration costs and variable transport costs. The productivity cutoff between exporters
and non-exporters in equilibrium is defined by a zero-anticipated-exporting-profit condition
ΠX
(
s¯j , j, θ
ex
j
) ≡ 0 (ZAXP)
The distribution of exporting firms is equivalent to µj(θ), truncated at θexj . Hence the probability that a
firm actively serves the foreign market is bexj = [1− Z(θexj )]/[1− Z(θoj )].
From the equilibrium distribution of active firms, those implementing each hiring strategy can be sum-
marized by a representative domestic firm with productivity θDj , where
θDj =
 11− Z(θoj )
∞∫
θoj
θβ−1z(θ)dθ

1/(β−1)
and a representative exporting firm, θXj , given by
θXj =
 11− Z(θexj )
∞∫
θexj
θβ−1z(θ)dθ

1/(β−1)
Aggregating over all firms, and using symmetry between countries, the distribution of firms offering job mix
j active in any market is summarized by a representative firm with productivity θ¯j equal to
θ¯j =
[
1
Mj(1− bexj )
{
Mjθ
Dβ−1
j + b
ex
j Mj(τ
−1θXj )
β−1
}]1/β−1
Firms with productivity above the ZAP cutoff are willing to create employment vacancies and engage in
production for as long as it survives. The constant probability of firm destruction each period is δ, so that
the value of entry is given by
V(θ)ent = max{0, 1
δ
Π (s¯j , j, θ) ,
1
δ
Π (s¯j , j, θ)}
Prior to the realization of their specific productivity level, firms are willing to pay the sunk investment cost so
long as the probability of successful entry and the anticipated profits are great enough. Hence the free-entry
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conditions for active firms are
1− Z(θoj )
δ
Π(s¯j , j, θ¯j) ≡ fe (FE)
Given the relationships defined in equation (9), the zero-anticipated-profit condition can be expressed in
terms of average firm profits. So, as in Melitz (2003), the intersection of the free entry conditions (FE) and
the zero-anticipated-profit conditions (ZAP) determine unique cutoff productivity levels, θoj . These cutoffs
imply a unique equilibrium distribution of firms that are willing to create employment vacancies and then
engage in production.
3.2 Mass of Active Firms
A steady-state equilibrium requires that the mass of active firms offing each job mix, Mj , is stationary over
time. The mass of new firms Mentj , with fraction bj who decide to hire workers and produce, must exactly
replace firms that expire. That is, in equilibrium, bjMentj = δMj . At the time of entry all firms share
the same expectations regarding aggregate prices, P¯ , their potential productivity draw, θ¯j , probability of
becoming and exporter, bexj , and recruiting quality s¯j . So applying standard methods reveals that the mass
of firms choosing each job mix is tied to the equilibrium payments to labor according to15
Mj =
R¯j
r(θ¯j)
=
V (s¯j , j, θ¯j)Lpj + L
ent
j
β[ΠD(s¯j , j, θ¯j) + bexj ΠX(s¯, j, θ¯j)]
(10)
where the total mass of labor employed in each job mix is given by the array of workers employed in
production, Lpj =
∫
∪nk=1Σkj
1da plus investment tasks Lentj .
Together the distribution and mass of firms using each hiring strategy are sufficient to describe prices:
the aggregate price index is
P =
∑
j=1,2
Mjp(s¯j , j, θ¯j)1−β +
∑
j=1,2
bex
∗
j M
∗
j τ
1−βp(s¯∗j , j, θ¯
∗
j )
1−β
1/(1−β) . (11)
Having derived the conditions for a steady-state equilibrium to arise in product markets I turn next to the
characterization of the labor market.
15The mass of firms is determined before individual recruiting outcomes are known. As long as workers hold a diversified
portfolio, any excess profits or losses that arise following the assignment of workers to firms are retained by the labor force.
Hence the link between anticipated aggregate revenue, R¯, and the mass of labor employed in each industry is upheld.
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3.3 Effort and Skill Acquisition
A worker with ability a chooses the amount of skills to acquire, s, and subsequently an effort level, e,
that maximizes utility for her employment status and aggregate prices. The first order conditions describing
worker behavior can be greatly simplified by noting that effort levels are always decreasing for any vf , vo > 0.
No firm will reward a worker if she fails to send a positive signal, regardless of the optimal wage scheme or
types of occupations offered16. Then substituting vf = vo = 0, the optimal effort levels of a worker in any
occupation γkj satisfies
1
s
1
p′ (es)
≡ γkj [((s)U(vs, P ) + (1− ((s))U(vw, P )] (12)
Clearly, effort is increasing in each performance payment; i.e. the effort supply curve is upward sloping.
Furthermore, agents that acquire more skill will exert greater effort during production, for any wage scheme
and occupation. The amount of skill accumulated is endogenous and chosen by a worker given her innate
ability. Optimal skill accumulation is given by
sa ≡ a1/2
[
γkj [((s)U(v
s, P ) + (1− ((s))U(vw, P )] + es
]1/2
(13)
Workers that foresee employment in a job with larger performance incentives will choose to obtain greater
skill. It is also evident from equation (13) that lower prices raise the marginal utility of income, and so workers
respond by obtaining more skill. I will return to this point when discussing labor market adjustment to trade
liberalization. For now I move directly to the performance payments offered by firms.
3.4 Incentive Contracts and Wages
The firm’s problem of setting optimal performance payments can be understood as a two-stage process: first
the firm chooses the least-cost contract that incentives workers, and second decides on the vector of effort it
wishes to elicit. An optimal incentive contract minimizes the expected unit costs of production, encouraging
effort so long as the expected performance justifies the expenditure. In other words, equilibrium performance
payments must equate the slope of the firm’s expected unit cost function, with the slope of the workers’
behavior regarding effort in equation (12). Implicit differentiation of each equation provides a relationship
between payments, dv
s
dvw , consistent with the rational behavior of both firms and workers. Equating the slopes
16Under limited liability the participation constraint for any agent is non-binding. In this instance it is well known that
principals optimally select vf = vo = 0.
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to find the optimal performance payments yields
U ′(vw, P )
U ′(vs, P )
=
nP
k=1
γkj p(es)
n − Γ
n∏
k=1
p(es)
γkj p(es)− Γ
n∏
k=1
p(es)
> 1 (14)
Optimal payments will yield relative utilities that are greater than one as long as the worker whose
incentive compatibility constraint that binds the provision of incentives has a less-than-average chance of
success; i.e. γkj p(es) ≤
Pn
k=1 γ
k
j p(es)
n . In general a firm cannot offer a single incentive contract such that every
worker’s incentives to provide effort are just binding. Yet, the firm is most concerned with incentivizing
workers where the marginal return to effort is the greatest. With decreasing returns, the greatest marginal
returns come from motivating low-skill workers who otherwise exert little effort. Hence profit maximizing
firms will offer contracts that just align the incentives of a worker who has a less-than-average chance of
success.
Workers are risk averse, and so (14) implies that the optimal payment scheme satisfies vs > vw. Firms
offer incentive contracts with Joint Performance Evaluation, rewarding team successes more heavily than
individual performance. Incentive contracts with JPE avoid discouraging low ability workers as they are
likely to be outperformed by their more skilled teammates. Note that the optimal wage scheme is JPE for
any chosen mix of jobs.
With the least cost method to incentivize workers from equation (14), firms must then choose what level
of effort they wish to elicit. Performance payments are made to minimize expected unit costs. Solving the
minimization problem yields
dV (%s, j, θ)
d%e
1
V (%s, j, θ)
≡ dt(%e, j)
d%e
1
t(%e, j)
(15)
i.e. the percentage increase in payments necessary to motivate effort must be equivalent to the percentage
increase in expected performance. Though JPE is always the optimal type of incentive contract, the actual
value of each payment varies across teams. Each firm makes performance payments commensurate with the
skill of the workers recruited.
3.5 Matching of Workers into Teams
Under a Joint Performance Evaluation payment scheme workers view the successes of their partner as
strategic compliments for their own. Looking at the indirect utility function, Ba, the relative benefits of own
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skill and the skill level of any other teammate s˙ to agent a’s expected payoff are given by
∂2Ba
∂s∂s˙
= γkj p
′ (es)
des
ds
d((s)
ds˙
[U(vs, P )− U (vw, P )] > 0 (16)
The difference in the utility of incomes under JPE, desdes˙ , and
d'(s)
ds˙ are all positive. Then using the fact that
ds
da > 0 always, equation (16) reveals that agent payoffs are supermodular in agent types. Using the well
know results from Legros and Newman (2007), supermodularity of individual payoffs is sufficient for positive
assortative matching to arise for any distribution of ability. Thus Ck1 and Ck2 are non-decreasing and unique
matching correspondences between workers employed in the same occupational mix. The final component
of an equilibrium is the assignment of skills (and implicitly abilities) to occupations.
3.6 Assignment of Workers to Occupations
Workers are fully mobile. They are free to pursue occupations that best reward their skill at any firm using
either job mix. All workers prefer occupations associated with high values of γkj . Higher skilled workers
can provide more effort at a lower cost to their overall utility. As a consequence those with greater skill
benefit proportionally more from employment guaranteeing better chances of success. To see this formally
note that, given the discrete improvements to expected performance across occupations, the relative benefits
of supervision across agent types are
∂
∂s
(
∆Ba
∆γkj
)
= p′ (es)
des
ds
((s) [U (vs, P )− U (vw, P )] + p′ (ea) des
ds
U (vw, P ) > 0 (17)
Worker payoffs, Ba, are supermodular in occupations and skill, which is sufficient for positive assignment of
workers to occupations according to ability.
The highest (lowest) skilled workers are employed in occupations with the greatest (smallest) performance
incentives and guidance from firms. According to the definition of occupational diversity, it must be that γ12
and γn2 are the least- and most- skill intensive occupations, respectively. In fact, with positive assignment the
monotone ratio likelihood property is a sufficient condition for the entire diffuse set of occupations to employ
relatively higher and lower skilled workers about the median occupation, in terms of stochastic dominance.
Conversely, the hiring strategy with similar occupations will employ relatively more middle-skill workers,
in terms of stochastic dominance17. Firms that implement either hiring strategy will employ workers with
17Formally the relative skill intensity across occupational mixes is summarized by
R
Σk<kˆj=2
dG(a) ≤ R
Σk<kˆj=1
dG(a) and
R
Σk>kˆj=1
dG(a) ≤
R
Σk>kˆj=2
dG(a), and the fact that skill acquisition is monotonically increasing in ability.
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many skill levels, however they can be compared directly by considering the relative distributions of skill
employed in equilibrium.
All firms hire exactly one worker for each occupation in their chosen job mix. Hence employment must
be balanced in the sense that the sets of skills assigned to each occupation have equal mass.
∣∣Σkj ∣∣ ≡ ∣∣Σhj ∣∣ for all k, h = 1...n and j = 1, 2 (18)
Occupation assignments dictate the skills of workers that firms expect to recruit. With team formation
fixed by worker matching behavior, a firm’s expectation is formed regarding the rank of worker skills within
each occupation18. All firms pay the same expected wage per performance so teams are recruited randomly.
Firms expect to draw the median skill level in each occupation (i.e. the average rank) so that the anticipated
workforce is composed of teams described by the array
s¯j = [med(Σ1j ),med(Σ
2
j ), . . . ,med(Σ
n
j )] (19)
3.7 Full Equilibrium in the World Economy
A full equilibrium is a vector {µj(θ),Mj , θexj ,Σkj , Cj : Σ1j → Σkj , V (%s, j, θ)} defined for each job mix, j, and
occupation, k. The preceding conditions generate the following result.
Proposition 1 A full equilibrium in an open economy exists and is unique.
Proof. See appendix19.
The equilibrium allocation derived above reflects worker and firm behavior in a environment where final
labor recruiting and production outcomes are uncertain. Hiring outcomes reveal the skill of workers engaged
in production, but not their actual performances. Yet, observations of firm characteristics such as output,
labor productivity, or the wage bill reflect both the anticipated outcomes which drive the economy toward
equilibrium, and the ex post realizations among the workforce. Then what does a full equilibrium in the
world economy look like?
18It is not possible, for example, for a firm to draw workers with skills equal to supΣkj and inf Σ
h
j within the same team.
Moreover the firm is not concerned with the average skill assigned to each occupation because for general distributions of ability,
the expected values may not correspond to the same ranking across occupations, and hence cannot be considered as potential
equilibrium recruits.
19An equilibrium in the open economy can be understood as a simple pigeon-hole problem in the assignments over Σkj . Firms
face information and organization constraints so that employment must be balanced across occupations. An equilibrium hinges
on showing that firms are willing to implement hiring strategies such that a fixed point exists where the pigeon-hole problem
is resolved.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Labor Productivity Within and Across Firms in the Open Economy
Realized labor productivity within firms using both occupational mixes is illustrated in Figure 2a20. The
zero-anticipated-profit cutoff will bind the distribution of active firms using both potential job mixes. Firms
draw productivity parameters from the same distribution, regardless of their eventual hiring strategy. So
firms must be indifferent between the anticipated labor performances for either occupational mix, if the
economy is at a stable equilibrium. The entry behavior of risk neutral firms leads to an equal expected team
performance across job mixes. On the other hand, firms that implement different hiring strategies will face
different variability in labor performance, based on compositions of workers hired. Perhaps surprising, firms
offering a diffuse job mix face a smaller variability in labor performance. When firms offer employment in
diffuse occupations they recruit a few high skill workers that consistently perform, as well as a few very low
skill workers who consistently do not perform.
Proposition 2 Firms which offer similar occupations (j=1) exhibit a greater variability in labor performance
than firms that offer a diffuse set of occupations (j=2).
Proof. Each worker performs independently where individual successes have a Binomial Distribution. Given
that (1) effort is increasing in ability/skill, (2) there is positive assignment of workers across occupations,
and (3) the probability of successful labor performance is increasing in γ and effort, the following relationship
holds:
∑h
k=1
∫
Σk2
[γk2p(e)dF2(e)] <
∑h
k=1
∫
Σk1
[γk1p(e)dF1(e)] for all h, where Fj(e) is the distribution of effort
levels defined implicitly for the abilities of workers assigned to occupations in mix j. This criterion, plus
identical means in labor performance, is equivalent to the definition of Third-Order Stochastic Dominance.
Then lower variability of labor performance is evident from the fact that under any concave utility function,
with decreasing absolute risk aversion, recruiting workers in occupations corresponding to j=2 is preferred.
20Figure 2 was generated by simulating labor performances across 10,000 firms, with productivities parameters drawn from
a Pareto distribution. Each firm draws teams of 10 workers from a uniform distribution where team formation corresponds to
positive assortative matching across occupations. Successes for each worker arrive according to a Poisson process.
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(See Bawa (1975).) It is worth noting that a more restrictive property concerning the variances in labor
performances also holds. It follows from the binomial distribution for the success of each worker that the
variance in labor performance at firms employing occupational mix j is σ2j =
∑N
k=1 γ
k
j p(e¯j) − [γkj p(e¯j)]2.
So the difference in variances is σ21 − σ22 =
∑N
k=1[γ
k
2p(e¯2)]2 −
∑N
k=1[γ
k
1p(e¯1)]2. Using the fact that the
each variance is a convex transformation of realized labor performance, stochastic dominance ensures that
σ21 − σ22 > 0.
Figure 2a illustrates within-firm variation in labor productivity based solely on team performance. Firms
also differ in their capability (θ) to produce output from individual successes. Variation in labor productivity
across all firms is illustrated in Figure 2b. The distribution of output is centered on θt(e¯, j), over the
equilibrium distribution of firm-specific productivities, µj(θ). The narrow band represents one standard
deviation of labor performances when recruiting diverse workers, and the wide band is one standard deviation
in labor performance among firms recruiting similar workers. Deviations from the anticipated output reflect
the inherent randomness of both recruiting and performance. The following proposition describes aggregate
volatility in labor productivity.
Proposition 3 Across all firms, the variance in observed labor productivity is increasing in average the
productivity of firms operating in equilibrium, defined as the the Firm Composition Effect, and increasing in
the share of firms offering similar occupations (according to j=1), called the Team Composition Effect.
Proof. Firm level output is given by θt(%e, j) so that the observed variance in labor productivity across
firms using either job mix is σ2θσ
2
j + θ¯2σ2j + t(%e, j)2σ2θ . The Firm Composition Effect is evident by consid-
ering an increase in average firm productivity θ¯. Aggregate volatility also reflects the share of teams using
each job mix; across all firms the variance in labor productivity is M2l(2, θ¯2)[σ2θσ
2
2 + θ¯22σ22 + t(e¯, 2)2σ2θ ] +
M1l(1, θ¯1)[σ2θσ
2
1 + θ¯21σ21 + t(e¯, 1)2σ2θ ]. From proposition 2 we have σ
2
2 < σ
2
1 . The Team Composition Effect
can be seen by noting that aggregate volatility is increasing in M1M1+M2 .
The Firm Composition Effect is seen by moving rightward across Figure 2b. When average firm pro-
ductivity is high there are greater swings in output as worker performances vary randomly. The Team
Composition Effect is evidenced by the thickness of the bands around the anticipated level of output. For
any productivity level the standard deviation in output is smaller when hiring a diverse workforce. So,
aggregate volatility will lessen as more firms offer a diffuse set of occupations.
Workers are compensated for their performances. Hence the distribution of labor productivity across
occupations and skill groups informs about the distribution of wages paid in the world economy. Note that
the firm hiring strategy aimed at a diverse set of workers corresponds to a more steep provision of incentive
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Figure 3: Income Distribution across Job Mixes
contracts. Firm hiring strategies then have the following implications for the distribution of wages.
Proposition 4 Wage inequality across skill groups will be greater when the share of firms that offer a
diffuse set of occupations is relatively large. Wage inequality within the highest and lowest skill groups is also
increasing in the share of firms offering a diffuse set of occupations.
Proof. The distribution of income across all workers is summarized by
∑
j=1,2Mj l(j, θ¯j)
∫
∪nk=1Σkj
γkj p(e)[((s)vs + (1− ((s))vw]dF (e).
Note ((s) is strictly increasing. Third-Order Stochastic Dominance of labor performance was demonstrated
in the proof of proposition 2. This implies that output, and subsequently wages, for a team employed in
occupations according to j=1 Lorenz dominates payments to workers in occupations across j=2. See Lambert
(1993). So, as a larger share of the workforce is employed at firms offering a diverse set of occupations
(high M2l(j, θ¯2) in equilibrium) the aggregate wage distribution becomes more unequal in terms of Lorenz
Dominance. Recall that in equilibrium, firms that offer occupations according to j=2 will employ relatively
more high and low skill workers, in terms of stochastic dominance. Thus inequality within these groups is
also rising in the employment shares of occupations corresponding to j=2. The result can also be established
using the variance in wages to measure inequality by direct calculation of the income distribution above.
The wage distribution is illustrated in Figure 3. The two dashed lines trace Lorenz curves for workers
employed in either job mix, where the more equal distribution of income corresponds to j=1. The solid
line represents the aggregate income distribution obtained in equilibrium, and is a weighted average (by
employment shares) of wages paid in each occupational mix. Lorenz Dominance will be instrumental when
examining the welfare effects of trade. Yet the fact that the distributional consequences of firm hiring
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strategies allow for direct comparisons of variance in (log-)wages will help connect the results to empirical
evidence in the literature.
This section has highlighted the consequences of firm behavior regarding incentive contracts and job mix
in the world economy. In what follows, I will examine how trade liberalization alters the equilibrium behavior
of firms. The results above provide a direct link between trade and the real features of an economy that we
are interested in.
4 Trade and Product Market Adjustment
In this section I briefly demonstrate how product markets adjust as international trading opportunities
become larger. This partial equilibrium response characterizes how firm entry and exporting behavior is
affected by falling trade costs, and how aggregate prices change when global competition intensifies. Real-
locations in the product market act as a catalyst for labor market adjustments; workers consider aggregate
prices when they choose a skill level to acquire, and the hiring potential of firms weighs on their job offerings.
The general equilibrium response to trade includes these labor market adjustments and I return to them
immediately below.
Let the skill distribution be fixed in a world equilibrium and consider trade liberalization that results from
falling transportation costs, τ . As markets become ’closer’ the opportunities to export and the average profits
earned abroad both increase. So as in Melitz (2003) the fall in trading costs shifts the zero-anticipated-profit
condition up such that the resulting equilibrium distribution of firms exhibits higher average productivity
via selection effects and reallocations across firms. (It is important to note that the ZAP condition shifts for
both potential job mixes, so that θ¯j increases for j=1,2.) Selection arises because the expansion of exporting
firms puts upward pressure on real wages paid to those responsible for the fixed production tasks. In more
open economies low productivity firms cannot justify the expense to maintain employment vacancies (f) and
must exit.
Selection of some domestic firms changes the provision of performance pay across the labor force. As
more firms enter the export market, the employment share of low skill occupations assigned to complete
fixed tasks of production must rise. Since workers in these occupations do not receive incentive contracts
the following result is obtained. (See proof in appendix.)
Proposition 5 Trade liberalization reduces the extent of the labor force which is offered incentive contracts,
and raises the employment share of low-skill occupations.
Regardless of the occupational mix that firms employ, lower trade costs induce reallocations of labor across
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firms and occupations according to proposition 5. More extensive low-skill employment relates to discussions
about the potential for openness to destroy ”good jobs” and create ”bad jobs” in their place. However, this
sort of reallocation of employment across firms and job types is not the most relevant adjustment in the
labor market. First, changes in employment from production tasks to fixed tasks occur only at a particular
skill margin, rather than having a significant impact across the whole labor force. Second, these changes
in employment separate the labor force into only two skill groups, low and high, while observed changes in
employment across the skill distribution exhibit more interesting and complex patterns21. The composition
of jobs over the entire labor force is determined by firms’ recruiting strategies. The next section relates trade
and the composition of employment by considering the skill acquisition behavior that guides firm hiring
practices.
5 Trade and Labor Market Adjustment
A partial consequence of openness in product markets is to reduce consumer prices. The general equilibrium
response to trade must include worker behavior regarding skill acquisition since lower prices raise the marginal
utility of income, and hence the skills used to earn wages. Workers respond to lower prices in their skill
acquisition behavior according the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The distribution of skills employed in each occupation for aggregate prices P stochastically dom-
inates the distribution of skills employed in the same occupations for any higher price level, P˙ > P .
Proof. Looking to optimal skill acquisition in equation (13), differentiation with respect to P , holding the
occupation of a worker fixed, reveals that workers increase their skill level when facing lower prices. Then
considering the distributions of skill in any occupation Σkj for price level P and Σ˙kj for price level P˙ we have∫
Σkj
T
Σ˙kj
sadG(a) ≤
∫
Σkj
T
Σ˙kj
s˙adG(a)
As the labor force changes shape the pre-trade allocation is no longer stable. Firms are confronted by a
labor force with greater skill and so face new hiring possibilities. Renewed competition among workers for
the best occupation assignments and teammates also changes the organization of the labor force. Lemma
1 compares the distributions of skills within occupations at different price levels to account for resorting
across changing employment opportunities. For any equilibrium allocation, every occupation will be filled
by higher skilled workers in terms of stochastic dominance.
21It is also important to recognize that the real wage paid to low-skill workers increases with trade. The accompanying
reduction is skill requirements also benefit worker utility. Hence it is not apparent that employment in a newly created ”bad”
job necessarily lowers the welfare of a worker. Section 7 provides more discussion on this point.
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Skill accumulation among the labor force will most benefit the firms that hire from the top of the skill
distribution22. These must be firms that offer a diffuse set of occupations with the strongest incentive
contracts available. Equilibrium in a liberalizing country can only be restored if tighter competition for
high-skilled workers mitigates the potential for better recruiting. This point is made more clear by the
following proposition.
Proposition 6 A reduction in trade costs, τ , will increase the share of firms that offer diffuse sets of
occupations, M2M1+M2 .
Proof. See Appendix.
Propositions 5 and 6 are the key results in describing labor market adjustment to trade. Openness
reduces the extent to which performance contracts are offered, and increases the steepness of incentive
contracts across the entire labor force. Because of equilibrium sorting patterns in the labor market, the
provision of incentive contracts is tied to specific occupations and skill groups. Thus a corollary to the hiring
strategies of individual firms predicts how aggregate employment across skill groups responds to greater
openness.
Corollary 1 A reduction in trade costs, τ , leads to job polarization across the skill distribution. Specifically,
the employment share of low-skill and high-skill occupations will rise, while the employment share of middle-
skill occupations will fall.
This prediction is consistent with recent changes in labor usages across several developed countries. See
Goos and Manning (2007), Autor et al. (2006), and Goos et al. (2009). Empirical definitions of occupations
by skill include average years of schooling, mean occupational wage or cognitive requirements. Here, high
(cognitive) ability workers acquire more skills and earn higher wages (in expectation), so that the predicted
impact of trade on employment shares can be interpreted using each standard metric23.
6 Trade, Wages, and Welfare
The previous two sections described product and labor market adjustment to openness highlighting the
composition of firms and occupations. In this section I use these results to examine the distribution of
22This point is reenforced by the fact that higher ability workers accumulate relatively more skill as prices fall, i.e. ∂
2s
∂P∂a > 0.
23The current framework abstracts from firm hierarchies where occupational titles also inform about the composition of
employment. However, the same results would obtain in a setting where workers played a sequential game following the efforts
of a leader in the occupation with the best expected performance. The possibility for endogenous hierarchies in the multi-agent
framework would generate even stronger incentives for assortative matching as derived above. (Again see Kim (2010) and Kim
and Sly (2010) for more discussion on this point.) Considering different occupations within a firm hierarchy, the impact of trade
on employment shares across the skill-distribution also corresponds to job titles.
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wages and aggregate volatility as the world economy grows. Without a full parameterization of the model I
cannot address the wage gaps at the 90/50 or 50/10 percentiles directly. It will be easiest instead to describe
the wage distribution across skill groups. Recall that in terms of stochastic dominance, the diffuse mix of
occupations encompasses the highest and lowest skill jobs to receive performance contracts.
Adjustment in the mixes of occupations and performance contracts that workers receive leads to changes
in the distribution of wages across skills. Given that openness tends to reduce the share of the labor force
receiving performance payments, and increases the share of firms offering steep performance incentives, we
have the following implications for the wage distribution.
Proposition 7 Greater openness increases overall wage inequality. Specifically, the wages of the highest
and lowest skill groups increase relative to the median wage. In levels, the highest and lowest skill groups
gain in terms of real wages, while the real wages of middle-skill workers have an ambiguous relationship with
openness.
Proposition 7 describes a U-shaped differential in the distribution of income across skills. Autor et al.
(2008) find evidence of this pattern in the US after 1990. Goos and Manning (2007) show that the UK has
exhibited polarization in wages for a much longer period. Dustmann et al. (2009) find a U-shaped changes
in the West German wage distribution during the 1980s. Polarization of earnings is an event distinct from
simple increases in the skill-premium that have occurred during separate time periods. One may be concerned
that variability in performance payments, such as bonuses, has caused U-shaped inequality in annual income,
but that earning mobility may have offset the rising inequality over time. (By focusing only on steady-state
equilibria the theoretical framework exposes itself to this concern.) However, Kopczuk et al. (2010) show
that annual earning inequality trends in the US match the pattern of long-term earnings closely.
The key mechanisms underlying polarization in the labor market are skill accumulation and real price sav-
ings in an open economy. Globalization generally describes increases in several activities that cross borders:
offshoring, global production sharing, immigration, importing of intermediate goods, as well as exporting of
final goods. Yet, a shifts in labor demands due to offshoring or immigration are not competing hypotheses
to the market access/skill accumulation mechanism presented here. Each may operate in conjunction as the
world economy integrates.
A shift in the employment shares changes the distribution of income across skills. As workers are
reallocated across occupations the distribution of income within skill groups also changes. In particular,
openness increases the employment share of the highest and lowest occupations, thereby raising the degree
of heterogeneity in performance payments at each end of the skill distribution. See Figure 1. Hence the
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following relationship between trade and wage dispersion can be established.
Proposition 8 A reduction in trade costs increases wage dispersion within the highest and lowest skill groups
receiving performance contracts.
Polarization also appears in residual, or within-group, wage dispersion; see Autor et al. (2008). A prob-
lem arises when trying to link the results presented here to the empirical findings pertaining to residual
wages because of the role of skill accumulation. Lemieux (2006) demonstrated that changes in workforce
composition can generate spurious findings with respect to residual wages because of mechanical issues in
estimation. The results of proposition 8 follow from worker skill acquisition behavior in an open economy,
and represent actual (not mechanically perceived) changes in wages among skill-groups. By comparing net
increases in residual wages at the 90/10 percentiles to the gross changes at the 50/10 and 90/50 percentiles,
Autor et al. (2008) demonstrate that polarization in residuals actually occurred in the US after 1990. The
variation in wages within skill groups described by proposition 8 is due to differences in performance pay-
ments. Lemieux et al. (2009) confirm that this is a key source of variation of wages among similarly skilled
workers, especially high-skill groups24. Hence the preceding results are consistent with the recent dynamics
of the US income distribution.
Rising inequality within groups following trade liberalization has been observed by Attansio et al. (2004),
though they focus on tariff reductions in Columbia as opposed to reductions by its trading partners. More
closely related is the analysis of Helpman et al. (2010), who argue that international market access will
raise inequality within groups because exporting firms will screen workers more intensively, and pay higher
wages to better matches. These results speak directly to the evidence regarding exporter premium and wage
dispersion across firms in Bernard et al. (1995), Bernard and Jensen (1997), Dunne et al. (2004) and Fr´ıas et
al. (2009). Here rising wage inequality within groups is a consequence stochastic worker performances effects
and occupational assignments. Menezes-Filho et al. (2008) and Abowd and Kramarz (1999) highlight the
importance of worker effects and occupation of employment relative to establishment effects across several
countries. Still worker, occupation and establishment (firm) characteristics all appear crucial to explaining
the distribution of wages. The worker and occupational focus here should be viewed as complementary to
the emphasis on match-specific elements in Helpman et al. (2010).
Observed wages respond to trade via several mechanisms: skill accumulation, payment schemes, effort
levels, etc. The welfare effects of trade are less complicated because these determinants of the wage distri-
bution represent the endogenous behavior of workers and firms in the world economy.
24In Lemieux et al. (2009) and in proposition 8, rising wage dispersion among low-skill workers is mitigated by the fact that
few low-skill workers receive performance payments.
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Figure 4: Income Distribution in the Open Economy
With risk adverse agents only the provision of incentive contracts and aggregate price level influence wel-
fare. There are two countervailing forces at work when the world economy becomes more integrated. First,
trade reduces the aggregate price level. Since the competitive wage of low-skill workers in fixed production
tasks is the numeraire, openness increases the real wage of all workers. Second, trade changes the provision
of incentive contracts such that on average workers face more volatility in their income levels. (This is a
consequence of the Lorenz Dominance of the pre-trade wage distribution.) Thus, with risk adverse workers
populating each country the welfare effects of trade cannot be established generally. Krishna and Senses
(2009) find evidence that import competition in the US causes sustained increases in earnings volatility
among workers, with significant welfare consequences. Moreover, these observed changes in volatility re-
flect persistent increases in the variability of earnings, consistent with a new steady-state composition of
performance incentives being offered25.
Figure 4 illustrates the pre- and post- trade Generalized Lorenz curves as characterized by Shorrocks
(1983). The price effect of trade shifts the more unequal post-trade Lorenz curve up, raising the possibility
that the Generalized Lorenz curves cross twice. In this instance the welfare consequences of trade are
ambiguous, see Lambert (1993). Clearly, trade is more likely to be welfare improving when the price effect
is large.
A last point to discuss is the relationship between trade and variability in production. Recall that trade
will raise the average productivity of firms operating in equilibrium, and increase the share of firms that hire
production teams into diffuse occupations. Then using proposition 3 we have the following.
Proposition 9 Greater openness reduces the variability in labor productivity observed within firms on av-
25Another potential mechanism by which openness can influence earnings volatility is put forth by Rodrik (1997). He suggests
that by increasing the elasticity of demand for goods, trade exposure increases the elasticity of demand for labor. As a result
market shocks generate relatively larger swings in employment and wages.
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erage via the Team Composition Effect, but increases variability in labor productivity observed across firms
via the Firm Composition Effect.
The specific hiring strategies used by firms, and strategic changes following trade liberalization, are not
likely to be observed by an econometrician. The last proposition can help identify the mechanisms at work
in the model. Reductions in the volatility of labor productivity among firms that persist in open economies
would provide indirect evidence that firms adjust the provision of incentive contracts and occupations offered.
7 Discussion
Some of the specific features of the model were chosen for expositional reasons while some are necessary to
describe an equilibrium allocation in the labor market. Equations (16) and (17) are sufficient conditions
for positive matching within teams and positive assignment of workers to occupations. Workers perform
independently, so the firm cares only about the efforts of individual workers. The production process itself
exhibits no complementarities between the skills of workers. Positive assortative matching in equilibrium
team formation is a result of the strategic behaviors about efforts endogenous to the model26. Positive
assignment of workers, on the other hand, is due to the modeled proportional increase in signal quality that
comes from better jobs. If better employment guaranteed only a fixed (additive) increase in the propensity to
succeed, positive assignment may not arise. However, a more intensive provision of incentive contracts among
higher skilled workers is the empirically relevant scenario; see Lemieux et al. (2009) and Bayo-Moriones et
al. (2010). The assumptions regarding occupational diversity are made with this fact in mind.
Firm heterogeneity in the model above reflects differences in the ability to capture worker performance,
but no differences in the capacity of firms to harness worker skills. As a result all firms are equally competitive
in attracting teams of labor, and recruiting occurs randomly across firms offering the same occupations.
The model could easily include the possibility that firms can make investments that allow them to better
address the agency problem; i.e. pay a fixed costs to obtain a higher value of Γ. As a result, firms that
make investments in directing worker efforts would attract higher skilled teams, and exhibit greater labor
performance relative to those that do not. This approach has been taken by others in various contexts. See
Yeaple (2005) and Davidson et al. (2008) for investments in technologies with skill complementarities, and
Helpman et al. (2010) for investments in worker screening with complementarities between workers’ abilities.
While these authors have demonstrated that greater foreign market access can incentivize technological
and recruiting investments at the firm level, I am concerned presently with adjustments within firms, and
26If the production environment were any such that firms offered JPE wage schemes, then the behavior of workers would still
lead to positive matching. Under JPE incentive contracts desdes˙
> 0 and hence equation (16) remains positive.
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across occupations. Evidence of skill-upgrading (i.e. relatively greater demand for high skills) in exporting
firms has been presented in the literature, but this mechanism is absent from the model to highlight the
diversity of occupations in open economies.
One final issue to discuss is dynamics in the model. The hiring and entry behavior of firms in equilibrium
are responses to their anticipated recruiting potential. Since the firm has to pay fixed costs to maintain
employment vacancies regardless of the workforce it recruits, one may be concerned that firms may change
their hiring behavior over time. For example a firm that recruits several teams of high quality might find
it optimal to expand its workforce in the following period. Of course, this behavior could unravel the
equilibrium derived above. While not modeled explicitly, the motivation for assuming firms perennially face
uncertain recruiting outcomes is rooted in high levels of labor mobility. Davis et al. (1998) document large
changes in firm-level employment within sectors that reallocate nearly a fifth of the labor force each year.
Burgess et al. (2000) find additional mobility in the labor market as workers leave firms where employment
opportunities persist. The high volume of worker flows into and out of firms suggest that recruiting is a
constant issue that must be addressed27.
8 Conclusion
When decomposing income distributions in many countries, worker, occupation and residual elements are
tantamount to wage variation resulting from firm effects, if not more important. A refined look at wage
dispersion across skill groups reveals that changes in inequality and labor usage are often more complex
than simple shifts in the skill premium. Many developed countries have experienced prolonged episodes
of polarization, or U-shaped differentials across skill levels, in both wages and employment. Furthermore,
as labor market outcomes have transformed, so have the payment methods used to clear the market. The
provision and composition of incentive contracts appears fluid and crucial to explaining changes in the
wage distribution. This paper examined the impact of openness on these features of the labor market in a
framework that incorporates contracting problems, occupational diversity and worker heterogeneity.
Labor market adjustment was characterized in terms of worker skill acquisition behavior and firm choices
regarding occupations and performance contracts. First, workers respond to openness by skill-updating.
Recognizing changes in the composition of the labor force, firms alter their hiring strategies towards em-
ployment with a more steep, but less extensive, provision of performance pay, as well as relatively greater
usage of high- and low- skill occupations. The implications of labor market adjustment for wage outcomes
27The roles of workforce adjustment and random variation in firm-level productivity in shaping trade patterns is taken up by
Cunat and Melitz (forthcoming).
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are rising inequality, with middle-skill workers loosing relative to those at the top and bottom of the skill
distribution. Changes in the provision of incentive contracts introduced more income risk for the average
worker, making the welfare consequences of openness difficult to characterize generally.
A key feature of both trade patterns and the wage distribution that is missing from the analysis is industry
effects. Though it was not highlighted in the text, there is a large role for industry composition to influence
trade adjustment. Firms choose their hiring strategies based on the their expectations regarding worker
performances; the fact that profits and revenues are convex functions of labor performance was instrumental
in deriving their behavior both pre- and post- trade. The convexity of these outcomes is fully described
the elasticity of demand for their goods. Hence these elasticities inform about the extent of adjustments
to occupational diversity and incentive contracts across different industries. A full analysis of this point is
deferred to future study.
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Appendix
Existence and Uniqueness of Full Equilibrium: proof of proposition 1
Given the job compositions in Definition 1, a labor market equilibrium is characterized by unique effort
levels for each worker that satisfy equation (12); skill acquisition behavior governed by (13); wage schemes
for each any team recruited according to equations (14) and (15); for any mix of jobs, worker payoffs are
supermodular in skills (equation 16), so that matches between workers are positively assorted; expected
performance payments are supermodular in skill and occupations, so that workers are positively assigned to
incentive contracts as in (17). These conditions define an unique core allocation for any aggregate price level
P .
A steady-state equilibrium in product markets can be established for any stable allocation of the labor
force using methods identical to Melitz (2003). A full equilibrium exists and is unique only if stable product
and labor market equilibria coincide. Connecting product and labor market allocations into a full equilibrium
requires firms to be willing to offer employment opportunities such that an assignment across occupations
is balanced, with full employment.
Firm hiring strategies are bound in equilibrium by the ZAP condition for each job mix. In equilibrium
firms must be indifferent between the labor performance they expect from the teams they anticipate to
recruit. The Indifference Condition is
Π(s¯1, 1, θo1) ≡ Π(s¯2, 2, θo2) (IC)
The willingness of firms to offer different occupational mixes is described by the Indifference Condition.
However firms are only able to offer job mixes that satisfy definition 1. Regardless of the mix of occupations
that firms choose, they will hire one worker per job type. So, there is a series of Balance conditions that
must be satisfied by firm hiring strategies in equilibrium. Using γk=1j=2 as the reference occupation for each
job mix without loss of generality, and assuming an atomless distribution of worker abilities, the Balance
Condition requires that for all occupations k = 1...n, in job mix j = 2, the following holds∣∣Σ12∣∣ = ∣∣Σk2∣∣ (BC.1)
Employment in the alternate job mix must also be balanced and evenly divide the remaining mass of workers.
The series of Balance conditions for job mix j = 1 across all occupations k is
∣∣Σ12∣∣ = n(L− Lent)Lp2 − L
p
1
Lp2
∣∣Σk1∣∣ (BC.2)
Full employment requires that production workers for each job mix Lj and workers assigned to fixed
tasks of production Lent cover the entire labor force. Non-production workers are assigned to investment
tasks necessary for any production level. So the wage bill of these worker must equal aggregate profits:
Lent =M1Π(s¯1, 1, θ¯1) +M2Π(s¯2, 2, θ¯2). Then full employment must satisfy
L− Lent − Lp1 − Lp2 =
L−M1Π(s¯1,1, θ¯1)−M2Π(s¯2, 2, θ¯2)−
n∑
k=1
∣∣Σk1∣∣− n∑
k=1
∣∣Σk2∣∣ ≡ 0 (FE)
Given positive assignment over the number 2n + 1 different occupations available there are 2n cutoff
values that need to be determined to describe a full equilibrium (Walras’ Law). Full employment across all
occupations is one condition of a full equilibrium. The Balance Conditions provide 2n− 2 implicit functions
of the ability cutoff levels; the missing conditions arise because the mass of agents in one occupation cannot
be related to itself, and the balance condition does not apply to occupations necessary to complete fixed
tasks of production. The final equilibrium condition is the Indifference Condition regarding job mix offered
by firms. (The Indifference Condition provides an implicit function of the equilibrium cutoff values for each
occupation per the definitions of s¯j .) Therefore it only remains to show that with Full Employment the
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Incentive Compatibility and Balance conditions determine unique ability cutoffs between occupations. To
verify existence of an equilibrium we find a correspondence, F(·), that maps the [amin, amax]2n space onto
itself, such that any fixed point is an equilibrium. Then we demonstrate that the correspondence indeed
contains a fixed point.
Since the correspondence must be defined such that any fixed point is an equilibrium we write F(·) =
[FIC , FBC12 , FBC22 , ..., FBCn−11 , FFE ] to accommodate each equilibrium requirement. We need to define four
types of correspondences: one for indifference, one for balance within job mix j=2, one for balance in job
mix j=1, and one for full employment. Let
FIC (%a1,%a2) =
{
(%y1, %y2) ∈ [amin, amax]2n :∣∣Π (%y1, 1, θ¯o1)−Π (%y2, 2, θ¯o2) ∣∣ ≤ ∣∣Π(%˙y1, 1, θ¯o1)−Π(%˙y2, 2, θ¯o2) ∣∣,
∀(%˙y1, %˙y2) ∈ [amin, amax]2n
}
(A.4)
so that the correspondence maps vectors of abilities into the least non-negative value of the Indifference
Condition. Also, for occupations k = 1..n define
FBCk2 (%a1,%a2) =
{(
%b1,%b2
)
∈ [amin, amax]2n :∣∣∣∣∣ ∣∣∣Σ12 (%b1,%b2)∣∣∣− ∣∣∣Σk2 (%b1,%b2)∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣ ∣∣∣Σ12 (%˙b1,%˙b2)∣∣∣− ∣∣∣Σk2 (%˙b1,%˙b2)∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∀
(
%˙b1,
%˙b2
)
∈ [amin, amax]2n
}
(A.5)
and
FBCk1 (%a1,%a2) =
{(
%b1,%b2
)
∈ [amin, amax]2n :∣∣∣∣∣ ∣∣∣Σ12 (%b1,%b2)∣∣∣− ∣∣∣Σk2 (%b1,%b2)∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
[
L− L1 − Lent
L1
] ∣∣∣∣∣ ∣∣∣Σ12 (%˙b1,%˙b2)∣∣∣− ∣∣∣Σk2 (%˙b1,%˙b2)∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∀
(
%˙b1,
%˙b2
)
∈ [amin, amax]2n
}
(A.6)
so that these correspondences map vectors of abilities into the least non-negative values of the Balance
Conditions. Finally let
FFE (%a1,%a2) =
{(
%f1, %f2
)
∈ [amin, amax]2n :∣∣∣∣∣L−M1Π(s¯1, 1, θ¯1)−M2Π(s¯2, 2, θ¯2)−
n∑
k=1
∣∣∣Σk1 (%f1, %f2)∣∣∣− n∑
k=1
∣∣∣Σk2 (%f1, %f2)∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤∣∣∣∣∣L−M1Π(s¯1, 1, θ¯1)−M2Π(s¯2, 2, θ¯2)−
n∑
k=1
∣∣∣Σk1( %˙fγ1 , %˙fγ2)∣∣∣− n∑
k=1
∣∣∣Σk2( %˙fγ1 , %˙fγ2)∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∀( %˙fγ1 , %˙fγ2) ∈ [amin, amax]2n
}
(A.6)
The are several things to note about these correspondences. First, they are everywhere hemicontinuous.
Second, they are each defined over the convex, compact set of abilities [amin, amax]. Lastly, all together,
F(·) maps [amin, amax]2n onto [amin, amax]2n. So by Kakutani’s theorem, these correspondences have a fixed
point. Each correspondence is defined to map vectors of ability into the least non-negative values of the
equilibrium conditions. If each correspondence maps to a fixed point, then it must return cutoff vectors
that satisfy equal expected profits across job mixes, equal mass of employment across occupations, and full
employment. Because such a fixed point must exist, so must an equilibrium. The last step is to establish
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uniqueness.
A sufficient condition for uniqueness is that the Jacobian matrix of the equilibrium conditions is sign-
definite. With positive assignment, the range of abilities employed in each occupation is convex so that we
can describe the equilibrium using the upper-ability cutoffs for each occupation28; define the upper-ability
cutoff for occupation γkj as Akj , and for workers performing fixed tasks, Af . Without loss of generality, write
the column-elements of the Jacobian matrix as the derivative of each equilibrium condition, with respect to
Akj for job mix j = 2 and then j = 1, in ascending order of k, and finally Af . Then, write the row-elements
with the Indifference Condition (IC) stacked over the Balance Conditions (BC.2 then BC.1) and the Full
Employment Condition (FE) last.
Then the Jacobian matrix of the system of equilibrium conditions is
dΠ(s¯2,2,θ
o
2)
dA12
dΠ(s¯2,2,θ
o
2)
dA22
· · · dΠ(s¯1,1,θo1)
dA11
dΠ(s¯1,1,θ
o
1)
dA21
· · · dΠ(s¯2,2,θo2)dAf
G(A12) −G(A22) 0 0 0 · · · 0
G(A12) 0 0 0 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . . 0 0 · · · 0
G(A12) 0 0 −L
p
1
Lp2
G(A11) 0 · · · 0
G(A12) 0 0 0 −L
p
1
Lp2
G(A21) · · · 0
...
...
...
...
...
. . . 0
−dΠ(s¯2,2,θo2)
dA12
−Π(s¯2,2,θo2)
dA22
· · · · · · · · · · · · −dΠ(s¯2,2,θo2)dAf

As we are only interested in the sign-definiteness of the matrix above, it is helpful is write it simply in
terms of the signs of each element.
+ + + · · · − − · · · +
+ − 0 0 0 0 · · · 0
+ 0 − 0 0 0 · · · 0
+ 0 0 − 0 0 · · · 0
+ 0 0 0 − 0 · · · 0
+ 0 0 0 0 − · · · 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . . 0
− − − − − − · · · −

It is straightforward to verify that the determinants of the principal minors of this matrix alternate in
sign, so that the Jacobian must be a negative-definite matrix. This verifies uniqueness of a full equilibrium.
Trade and the Provision of Performance Pay: proof of proposition 5
Workers employed to complete fixed entry tasks Lent = Lent1 + Lent2 , are engaged in the investment
activities that firms undertake prior to production. The market clearing condition for these workers ensures
that their wage bill is equal to aggregate profits: Lent = M1Π(s¯1, 1, θ¯1) +M2Π(s¯2, 2, θ¯2). The wage paid to
these workers is set to be the numeraire, so an increase in the total wage bill following trade liberalization
corresponds necessarily to an increase in employment, Lent, and with full employment and decrease in the
mass of labor receiving performance pay.
First note that lower trade costs, τ , increase exporting profits and the opportunities to export such that
profits of a representative firm rise; i.e. ddτ [Π
D(s¯j , j, θ¯j) + ΠX(s¯j , j, θ¯j)] > 0. From (10), higher average
profits with trade are associated with fewer firms operating in a more open equilibrium. Thus aggregate
profits respond to trade via an increase in average profits and a decrease in the mass of firms operating.
28Recall that the definition in (MLRP) does not make pairwise comparisons for all occupations so that each Akj may demark
a cutoff between occupations in the same, or alternate job mixes. Such a definition is not be necessary to establish a unique
equilibrium. Arbitrary orderings are permitted to maintain generality.
38
Trade reduces the extent of performance pay, and increases the employment share of low skill occupations,
Lentj , as long as the percentage change in the mass of firms is less that the percentage increase in profits of
the representative firm for j=1,2. Calculating directly,∣∣∣∣ dMjdΠ(s¯j , j, θ¯j) Π(s¯j , j, θ¯j)Mj
∣∣∣∣ = [ΠD(s¯, j, θ¯j) + bexΠX(s¯j , j, θ¯j)]− f − bexfx[ΠD(s¯j , j, θ¯j) + bexΠX(s¯j , j, θ¯2)] < 1
Trade and the Composition of Occupations: proof of proposition 6
The relative change in firm hiring strategies following trade liberalization can be seen by totally differen-
tiating equation (10) to obtain −ddτ
M2
M1
. A greater share of firms that offer a diffuse set of occupations when
an economy becomes more open corresponds to dM1M1 − dM2M2 > 0, since trade necessarily reduces the number
of firms of each type. Then using lemma 1, and totally differentiating across occupations,k, we have
−d
dτ
[
dMj
Mj
]
=
n∑
k=1
β−1
β
(
ρP θ¯jt($e,θ¯j)
$V (s¯jj,θ¯)
)β−2 [
XP + bexX∗P ∗τβ−2
] dt(·)
dskj
dskj
dτ
1
β
(
ρP θ¯jt($e,θ¯j)
$V (s¯jj,θ¯)
)β−1
[XP + bexX∗P ∗τβ−1]
=
n∑
k=1
dt(·)
dskj
dskj
dτ (β − 1)
[
XP + bexX∗P ∗τβ−2
]
(
ρP θ¯jt($e,θ¯j)
$V (s¯jj,θ¯)
)
[XP + bexX∗P ∗τβ−1]
So the percentage change in the mass of firms using each hiring strategy is an increasing, concave function
of team labor performance, t(%e, j), with a decreasing coefficient of Absolute-Risk Aversion. Since team
performances from occupations j=1 Third-Order Stochastically dominate performances in j=2, it must be
that dM1M1 − dM2M2 > 0. Following trade liberalization and skill updating by the labor force, fewer firms operate
in equilibrium, but relatively more firms that offer diffuse occupations remain.
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